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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Denton appeals, contending that was fundamental error in his trial 
created by prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments. Specifically, he 
asserts that the prosecutor misrepresented law, vouched for witnesses, and 
disparaged defense counsel during her closing statements. Since those improper 
statements impacted on Mr. Denton's constitutional right to a fair trial, are clear on the 
face of the record, and, either individually or cumulatively, prejudiced him, this Court 
should vacate the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Denton was charged with attempted strangulation. (R., pp.65-66.) The 
alleged victim, H.D., testified that Mr. Denton choked her during an argument over a 
pending divorce. (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, L.11 - p.23, L.4.)1 During the confrontation, H.D. was 
able to hit Mr. Denton several times, breaking his nose. (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, L.23 - p.23, 
L.7; Tr., Vol.2, p.102, L.5- p.103, L.1.) H.D. testified that this did not cause Mr. Denton 
to stop his attack, and also that he continued to choke her until she fell unconscious. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.16-20.) 
1 The transcripts are provided in several independently bound volumes. To avoid 
confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the voir dire, 
opening statements, and jury instructions. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the 
transcript of the trial testimony and closing statements. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the hearing on Mr. Denton's motion for a new trial. "Vol.4" 
will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Volumes 2-4 
are consecutively paginated. 
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However, inconsistencies in H.D.'s story were revealed during trial. For example, 
the testimony of Officer Brandi on her interview with H.D., revealed that 
H.D. had been able to break free by punching Mr. Denton and that H.D. had not 
reported falling unconscious. (Tr., Vol p.156, L.22 - p.157, L.8; Tr., Vol.2, p.156, 
Ls.18-21; see also Defendant's Exhibit D (Officer Gates' affidavit in support of probable 
cause for a warrant)2 .) However, the testimony of Dr. Heather Ellsworth, based on her 
medical evaluation of H.D., supported H.D.'s version of events. (Tr., Vol.2, p.83, 
L.22 - p.84, L.3; see also Defendant's Exhibit C (Dr. Ellsworth's dictated notes from her 
evaluation of H.D.).) 
During her initial closing statements, the prosecutor argued the ju "What 
she [Dr. Ellsworth] does is she takes the medical history. She down what she's 
told by the victim. Why isn't that hearsay under Idaho law? Because it's believed that 
any statements you make to a doctor are statements that you make to tell them about 
your injuries.'' (Tr. Vol.2, p.182, Ls.4-8.) In his own closing argument, defense counsel 
argued that H.D.'s version of events was not credible, particularly given the 
inconsistencies between her testimony and that of Dr. Ellsworth and Officer Gates. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.193, 19- p.201, L.19.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: 
But he [defense counsel] never challenged [H.D.] on any of those 
[inconsistencies]. He didn't pick [her statement] up and say, didn't you say 
here in your statement da-da-da-da-da-da. He never asked her because 
he didn't want her to say, that's not what I said. What does he do? He 
waits and gets Officer Gates on the stand and says [H.D.] told you this 
and that's inconsistent isn't it? ... You can't use double hearsay to prove 
somebody is inconsistent. You have to ask the person who made the 
comment and allow them to respond. So if you can't point out 
discrepancies in somebody's testimony to that person, let's use somebody 
else. 
2 Officer Gates' affidavit was admitted over the State's hearsay objection. ( See 
Tr., Vol.2, p.148, L.24-p.151, L.16.) 
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(Tr., Vol.2, p.210, L.20 - p.211, L.2.) The prosecutor continued in this vein: "You know, 
if you can't break your witness, if you can't make them say something inconsistent, what 
do you do? You go after law enforcement. So, sure enough, let's go after Officer 
Gates."3 (Tr., Vol.2, p.212, Ls.19-21.) 
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Denton as charged. (R., p.198.) The district 
court initially imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.277.) Mr. Denton successfully completed his period of 
retained jurisdiction. (See Augmentation - Order on Retained Jurisdiction Review 
Hearing, p.2.)4 As a result, the district court placed him on a three-year period of 
probation. (Augmentation - Order on Retained Jurisdiction Review Hearing, p.2.) 
In the meantime, Mr. Denton timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.281-83.) 
3 Defense counsel had been critical of Officer Gates' investigation, given her admission 
that she had indicated on her report that there was a prior history of violence on 
Mr. Denton's part based only on H.D.'s statement to that effect, even though, in looking 
at the police database, there was no such history. (Tr., Vol.2, p.153, L.15 - p.154, L.25; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.160, Ls.1-12.) In fact, Officer Gates admitted that she never interviewed 
Mr. Denton about the events in question, nor did she observe the injuries he had 
received. (Tr., Vol.2, p.139, L.20 - p.139, L.1; see also Tr., Vol.2, p.152, Ls.22-24 
1Officer Gates admitting she had not moved within ten feet of Mr. Denton).) 
A motion to augment the record was filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error 
by misstating the law, vouching for a witness, and disparaging defense counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error By 
Misstating The Law, Vouching For A Witness, And Disparaging Defense Counsel 
Prosecutorial Misconduct May Infringe Upon The Defendant's Constitutional 
Rights 
Where there is no contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial misconduct, it will 
only be reviewed for fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). To 
show fundamental error, the appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the error violates one 
of his unwaived constitutional rights, (2) the error is clear from the record, and (3) the 
error prejudiced him. Id. at 228. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate 
"there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." Id. 
Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial and due process therein. 
U.S. CONST., amend. VI; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. Prosecutorial misconduct in the 
closing argument can deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 752-54 (1991 ), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991); 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). 'The relevant question when 
assessing misconduct for constitutional error is whether the prosecutors' comments 'so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process."' State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718-19 (2011) (quoting 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. 637,643 (1974))). 
The rules regarding misconduct during closing argument are especially 
applicable to prosecutors because they: 
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too often forget that they are part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give counsel for the 
accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to 
see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
doing so transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that the defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but 
competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, 
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). Therefore, 
where the prosecutor fails in that responsibility, she may deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, tainting the subsequent conviction so that it cannot stand. See id.; 
State v. Griffiths, 101 1 165 ( 1980 ), abrogated on other grounds by V, 
LePage, 102 Idaho 387, (1981). Because misconduct may impact on a defendant's 
clear misconduct on the face of the record and that the misconduct prejudiced him, he 
can show fundamental error. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting The Law To The Jury 
A prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law during closing 
arguments. State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, 772 (Ct. App. 2014); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 
86. In this case, the prosecutor made two misrepresentations about the law when she 
told the jury: "You can't use double hearsay to prove somebody is inconsistent. You 
have to ask the person who made the comment and allow them to respond." (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.211, Ls.10-12.) 
The first misstatement relates to the assertion that defense counsel had to 
confront H.D. about the inconsistency in her statements to Dr. Ellsworth and Officer 
Gates. There is no such requirement in Idaho law. I.R.E. 806 specifically provides: 
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When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801 (d)(2)(C), 
(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant 
may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence 
which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as 
a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any 
time, inconsistent with declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject 
to any requirement that declarant may have been afforded an 
opportunity to deny or explain. 
I.R.E. 806 (emphasis added). As a result, "[w]hen such impeachment is done through 
the use of inconsistent staternents, IRE 806 excepts such impeachment from the 
requirement, applicable to testifying witnesses, that the witness have an opportunity to 
explain or deny the statement." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook§ 19.9, at 228-29 
(1995); see also State v. Barcefla, 135 Idaho 191, 203 (Ct. App. 2000). 
H.D.'s statements to Dr. Ellsworth constituted hearsay under the definition set 
forth in I.R.E. 80·1 (c). Those hearsay statements were admitted into evidence pursuant 
to I.R.E. 803(4 ). Officer Gates' testimony and affidavit constituted evidence of a 
statement inconsistent with the hearsay statements admitted through Dr. Ellsworth's 
testimony. Officer Gates' recounting of H.D.'s version of events was independently 
admissible evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 803(2) (excited utterance) and, specifically to her 
affidavit, I.R.E. 803(8)(A) (public record offered by the defendant). As a result, Officer 
Gates' testimony and affidavit were admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 806, meaning there 
was no requirement that the declarant (H.D.) be confronted with that inconsistency and 
afforded an opportunity to explain. 5 I.R.E. 806. Therefore, defense counsel's 
5 If the prosecutor had wanted to give H.D. the opportunity to explain the inconsistency, 
she always had the option of recalling H.D. before resting her case. See D. Craig 
Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook §18.3, at pp.205-06 ("The practical effect of this 
requirement [regarding challenging the witness with inconsistent statements] is that 
impeaching counsel must either confront the witness with the actual statement during 
the examination, or, if counsel chooses instead to offer the statement after the 
examination is completed, must make sure that the witness will be available for recall 
after the statement has been introduced to provide the required opportunities.") 
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presentation of H.D.'s inconsistent statements was proper and could be used by the jury 
to infer that H.D. lied. As a result, the prosecutor's statement to the jury that it would 
be inappropriate to use Officer Gates' testimony and statement to find H.D. not credible 
was a misstatement of the law, and thus, constitutes misconduct evident on the face 
of the record. 
The second misstatement of law relates to the assertion that, since Officer Gates' 
testimony constitutes double hearsay (i.e., hearsay within hearsay), it should not be 
considered. (Tr., Vol.2, p.211, Ls.10-11.) While the prosecutor had objected to the 
introduction of Officer Gates' affidavit recounting H.D.'s version of events on hearsay 
grounds, the district court had overruled that objection. (Tr., Vol.2, p.149, L.25 - p.151, 
L.16.) In so doing, the district court had made a legal ruling that the document, and 
Officer Gates' corresponding testimony was properly received as evidence. Therefore, 
for the prosecutor to argue that the jury could not consider Officer Gates' account of 
H.D.'s statements because it was double hearsay misstated the law, since that 
statement was properly presented to the jury as evidence. That error is also clear on 
the face of the record. 
Each of these misstatements of the law prejudiced Mr. Denton. As defense 
counsel pointed out in his motion for a new trial, the credibility of H.D.'s version of 
events was the critical point of the case. (R., pp.222-25.) The defense's primary 
strategy was to show H.D.'s account to be untrue (or, at least, introduce reasonable 
doubt on that point) by introducing evidence of H.D.'s inconsistent statements. 
(R., pp.222-24.) However, the prosecutor's misstatements of the law told the jurors that 
they could not properly consider the evidence of those inconsistent statements. As 
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such, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the verdict, and thus, the 
error prejudiced Mr. Denton. 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Vouching For The State's Witnesses, 
And That Error Is Clear From The Record 
A prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when she puts the prestige of the 
state behind that evidence by expressing her personal opinions or beliefs about the 
credibility of witnesses' testimony. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (Ct. App. 
201 O); State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111 (1979); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. However, 
both sides are allowed, as a matter of general policy, to discuss their respective 
standpoints and the inferences they have drawn therefrom. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 
61, 69 (Ct. App. 1998). In this case, the critical issue was H.D.'s credibility, particularly 
as to her assertions that she had not been able to break free and had lost 
consciousness. Two witnesses had offered testimony which impacted on that issue. 
Dr. Ellsworth's dictated notes, which memorialized H.D.'s statements to her, was 
consistent with H.D.'s testimony on those points. (See Exhibits, pp.15-16.) However, 
Officer Gates' affidavit of probable cause was not consistent on those points, not 
mentioning anything about H.D. losing consciousness and directly refuting her 
testimony that she was unable to break free. (See Exhibits pp.18-20.) 
The prosecutor made improper statements to bolster Dr. Ellsworth's testimony in 
this regard: "What she [Dr. Ellsworth] does is she takes the medical history. She takes 
down what she's told by the victim. Why isn't that hearsay under Idaho law? Because 
it's believed that any statements you make to a doctor are statements that you make to 
tell them about your injuries." (Tr. Vol.2, p.182, Ls.4-8.) The prosecutor specifically 
invoked the rationale of the hearsay rules: that statements "made for purposes of 
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medical treatment, are generally viewed as trustworthy because the declarant has an 
interest in being truthful so that appropriate medical treatment is provided." 2 Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence§ 6:23 (15th ed.). By invoking the hearsay rationales, the prosecutor 
suggested that, as a matter of law, the jury should find Dr. Ellsworth's testimony 
credible. 
For the same reasons discussed in Section B, infra, the prosecutor's improper 
vouching prejudiced Mr. Denton. 
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Disparaging Defense Counsel 
A prosecutor commits misconduct when she disparages a attorney 
135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); v. Brown, during closing argument. State v. 
131 Idaho 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1998). "prosecutor has every legitimate right to point 
out weaknesses in a defendant's case, but this can be done in many ways without 
attacking the defendant's counsel." State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 
1984 ). Therefore, the prosecutor may not "unfairly cast the role of a defendant's 
counsel." Id. 
As in Baruth, the prosecutor unfairly cast the role of defense counsel in this case, 
thereby improperly disparaging defense counsel by arguing about how defense counsel 
did his job, or discussing how defense counsel should have done his job, rather than 
commenting on the evidence itself: 
[Defense counsel] never challenged [H.D.] on any of those 
[inconsistencies]. He didn't pick [her statement] up and say, didn't you say 
here in your statement da-da-da-da-da-da. He never asked her because 
he didn't want her to say, that's not what I said. What does he do? He 
waits and gets Officer Gates on the stand and says [H.D.] told you this 
and that's inconsistent isn't it? ... So if you can't point out discrepancies 
in somebody's testimony to that person, let's use somebody else. 
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You know, if you can't break your witness, if you can't make them 
something inconsistent, what do you do? You go after law enforcement. 
So, sure enough, let's go after Officer Gates. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.210, L.20 - p.211, L.2; Tr., Vol.2, p.212, Ls.1 1.) As such, the 
prosecutor's misconduct in this regard is clear from the record. 
This error prejudiced Mr. Denton because, as discussed in Section 8, infra, the 
critical issue in this case was H.D.'s credibility. The prosecutor's disparaging 
statements were directed at defense counsel's strategy for demonstrating the 
inconsistencies in H.D.'s testimony. As such, the impact of these statements was to 
cause the jury to disregard defense counsel's attacks on H.D.'s credibility because, 
according to the prosecutor, they were improperly or inexpertly presented. such, 
is a reasonable possibility that 
affected the verdict, prejudicing Mr. Denton. 
inappropriate and disparaging comments 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Denton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the guilty verdict and the 
judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings 
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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